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State v. Williams
2021-Ohio-3152
I.

INTRODUCTION

Courts across the United States have long grappled with the issue of
joint representation of criminal defendants.1 While representation of
individual criminal defendants by the same attorney has never been
explicitly outlawed by the federal government or the state of Ohio,
discussions surrounding the issue, including calls for the practice to be
stopped, have grown in prevalence since the 1970’s.2 In fact, even the
various sets of ethical rules governing the conduct of attorneys, such as the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the American Bar
Association, allow this practice.3 Critics of the practice have pointed out
that joint representation, especially of criminal defendants, often forces
attorneys to make tough choices that may benefit one of their clients while
harming the other.4 For instance, an attorney representing two criminal
defendants may be forced to withhold a plea offer by the state for one of his
clients if it involves them testifying against another of his clients in the
same case.5
While critics of the practice of joint representation certainly have fair
arguments, attorneys, their clients, and legislators in favor of the practice
also have made several interesting points. To begin, joint representation is
often the most economical option for criminal defendants, especially those
wishing to avoid resorting to public defenders.6 Such joint representation
can also potentially make for a stronger case for each defendant, offering a
so-called “united front.”7 Lastly, defendants often want the best attorney in
the subject matter of the crime they are alleged to have committed, or are
familiar with a certain attorney, and do not want to be foreclosed from
retaining them because their co-defendant already has retained them.8
1. George L. Blum, Annotation, Circumstances Giving Rise to Prejudicial Conflict of Interests
Between Criminal Defendant and Defense Counsel—State Cases Concerning Waiver of Conflict: Form
and Context of Waiver, Duty of Court and Counsel, Responsibilities of Defendant, Impact of Applicable
Rules and Regulations, Colloquy Related to Waiver, and Discretion and Analysis of Court, 19 A.L.R.7th
3, *2 (2015).
2. Debra Lyn Bassett, Three’s a Crowd: A Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 387, 391 (2001).
3. Id. at 412.
4. Id. at 423.
5. Blum, supra note 1, at 32.
6. Bassett, supra note 2, at 433.
7. Id. at 434.
8. Id. at 433-34.
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In State v. Williams, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to adopt a
holding that would have required courts to inquire about potential conflicts
associated with joint representation anytime jointly represented codefendants came before them, thus affirming the ruling of the Eighth
District Court of Appeals.9 While joint representation of criminal
defendants certainly should not be outlawed in the state of Ohio, the Court
was wrong to allow the practice to continue without any oversight. This
decision will continue to propagate the negative effects of joint
representation, allowing defendants’ constitutional rights to be potentially
violated, all while a simple solution remains available to the Court.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case originated in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
resulting from the December 2018 indictment of husband and wife Marshall
and Shawnte Williams on drug related charges.10 Both Marshall and
Shawnte retained the same legal counsel during this process, and as a result,
procured a joint plea agreement.11 While Marshall pled guilty to one count
of drug trafficking and one count of drug possession, first and fourth-degree
felonies respectively, Shawnte was only required to plead guilty to a single
count of possession of criminal tools, a fifth-degree felony.12 Marshall
received a total of nine years prison time while Shawnte received five years
of probation and a $2,000 fine.13
Following the proceedings in the trial court, Marshall appealed his
conviction to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, claiming that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, “in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.”14 This appeal was prefaced on
Marshall’s claim that the trial court failed to ensure that no conflict was
present as a result of his joint representation with Shawnte.15 Marshall’s
appeal was overruled, as the court of appeals found no reason for the trial
court to question the joint representation of Marshall and Shawnte,
specifically the court found that Marshall had neither objected to the
arrangement, nor informed the trial court of his displeasure with the
arrangement.16
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

State v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3152 at 13 (2021).
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152 at 3.
Id.
Id.
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Marshall subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration with the court
of appeals, and an appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio.17 Before the
Supreme Court of Ohio accepted Marshall’s appeal, the court of appeals
“vacated its judgment in Williams I and issued a subsequent opinion, once
again affirming Marshall’s convictions.”18 Marshall then abandoned his
appeal of the original decision by the court of appeals, and appealed the
Court’s subsequent affirmation of his conviction, which the Supreme Court
of Ohio accepted for consideration.19
THE COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE

III.

A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, in which Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Fischer, DeWine, and
Donnelly concurred.20 Justice Brunner offered the lone dissenting vote and
opinion.21 In Justice Stewart’s majority opinion, the Court found that “when
a trial court does not know, and should not reasonably have known, of a
possible conflict of interest in an attorney’s representation of two or more
codefendants charged with a crime, the trial court has no affirmative duty to
inquire whether a conflict of interest exists.”22
In explaining its decision, the Court began by reaffirming the
constitutional right to counsel, stating that it mandates that “‘[b]oth defense
counsel and the trial court are under
an affirmative duty to ensure that a defendant’s representation is
conflict-free.’”23 The Court then went on to lay out the test it utilizes in
determining whether a criminal defendant was unduly prejudiced by joint
representation.24 The Court stated that when a criminal defendant objects to
their joint representation, or when the trial court “knew or reasonably
should have known that a possible conflict existed” as a result of joint
representation, it must inquire about said conflict.25 If it does not do so, then
it has failed its affirmative duty, and the case must be remanded for a
hearing to determine whether the conflict affected the verdict.26

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152 at 4.
Id. at 1, 13.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 5 (quoting State v. Dillon, 74 Ohio St.3d 166, 167-168 (1995)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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If a criminal defendant does not object to joint representation, and the
trial court has no reason to suspect that joint representation of criminal
defendants will cause a conflict, then the criminal defendant must prove that
some actual conflict due to their joint representation unduly prejudiced
them.27 According to the Court, such an actual conflict arises when “‘the
defendants’ interests do diverge with respect to a material factual or legal
issue.’”28 A criminal defendant simply raising the possibility of such a
divergence is not enough to overturn a conviction.29
The Court then utilized two of its own prior decisions to support its
findings, beginning with State v. Manross.30 In Manross, the Court upheld
the conviction of a defendant who had been jointly represented by the same
attorney as his codefendant, even though the trial court did not inquire about
any possible conflict due to this representation.31 In doing so, the Court
declined to impose an affirmative duty on a trial court to inquire about such
conflicts any time jointly represented codefendants came before them.32 On
the other hand, the Court did state that when a trial court “knows or has
reason to know of a potential conflict,” or if a defendant shows the
existence of an actual conflict, then the trial court does have the duty to
inquire about joint representation.33
The Court also went on to analyze its decision in State v. Gillard.34 In
this case, a jointly represented codefendant accepted a plea deal to avoid jail
time, and subsequently was presented as a defense witness at his
codefendant’s trial.35 In part due to this testimony, the codefendant was
convicted and sentenced to death.36 Upon review by the Supreme Court of
Ohio, it was found that “‘the trial court knew (or at least should have
known) that a possible conflict of interest existed’” and thus its affirmative
duty to inquire about joint representation arose.37 Since the trial court did
not make any such inquiry, nor advised the codefendant of his right to
conflict-free representation, the case was remanded to the trial court for a
hearing to determine whether an actual conflict had tainted the jury’s
verdict.38
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 (1980)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 7.
32. Id.
33. Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 7.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 9.
37. Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 9 (quoting State v. Gillard, 64 Ohio St.3d 304, 311-12, 595
N.E.2d 878 (1992)).
38. Id.
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Following this analysis, the Court turned its attention to the case at
hand.39 For several reasons, the Court found that Marshall had neither raised
the issue of a possible conflict nor entered anything into the record that
would have put the trial court on notice of a potential conflict.40 For
example, Marshall notified the trial court that he was satisfied with the
representation he received.41 Additionally, upon examination of the trial
court record, there was nothing that indicated the “possibility of a conflict”
due to the joint representation of Marshall and Shawnte.42 As such, the
Court found that the trial court did not have an affirmative duty to inquire
about the joint representation in this case.43
The Court further found that there was no proof that an actual conflict
existed because of Marshall and Shawnte’s joint representation.44 While
Marshall did raise the possibility that such a conflict existed, he fell short of
proving definitively that it did, which the Court stated is required to
“establish ‘the constitutional predicate for [a] claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel.’”45 Additionally, the Court stated that the fact that Shawnte was
“charged with fewer offenses” and “received a more advantageous plea
offer” did not prove the existence of an actual conflict.46
Finally, the Court addressed Marshall’s request that it hold that a trial
court must inquire about the propriety of joint representation of defendants
in every criminal case.47 While the Court agreed with Marshall that such a
practice would offer the best protection against the pitfalls of joint
representation, the Court declined to adopt such a rule.48 According to the
Court, such a decision should be left to the legislature to decide whether or
not such a practice is necessary.49
As such, the Court found that the trial court’s affirmative duty to inquire
about joint representation had not been triggered since the neither
Marshall’s own statements about his representation nor the trial court’s
record revealed that the trial court knew or should have known of a possible
conflict.50 Additionally, the Court found that Marshall had shown no actual
conflict had arisen because of his joint representation with Shawnte.51
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 10.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 11 (quoting State v. Manross, 40 Ohio St.3d 180, 182, 532 N.E.2d 735 (1988)).
Id.
Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
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Because of this, the Court affirmed the Eight District Court of Appeals’
judgment, upholding Marshall’s conviction.52
B. Justice Brunner’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brunner was the lone dissenting Justice in this case and
delivered the dissenting opinion.53 According to the dissent, a proper
analysis of the Ohio Constitution reveals that an inquiry into the propriety
of joint representation of criminal defendants is required by Article I,
Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.54 While this is the case, the dissent also
went on to provide guidance for a potential rule or statute regarding this
issue.55
The dissent’s argument in favor of the proposition that Article I, Section
10 of the Ohio Constitution require trial courts to inquire about joint
representation is that this section provides a broader right to counsel than
the United States Constitution.56 The dissent would interpret this provision
of the Ohio Constitution to give criminal defendant’s the right to be
independently represented, requiring such a right to be waived in a
“knowing and intelligent” manner.57 As such, the dissent would require that
trial courts advise defendants of this right, and the potential pitfalls of joint
representation, before accepting any such waiver of the right by a
defendant.58 Such pitfalls include the possibility that an attorney for
multiple criminal defendants in the same case may not be able to effectively
negotiate plea deals, may not be able introduce certain exculpatory evidence
if it harms one of the codefendants, and cannot pass blame from one
codefendant to another.59
The dissent also pointed out the failure of the majority’s rule, finding
that the conflict that arises when criminal defendants are jointly represented
often prevents an attorney from making the record that is required to trigger
the trial court’s affirmative duty.60 Additionally, attorneys and clients are
not always aware of the potential conflicts inherent in joint representation
and will not always be able to point them out to the trial court.61 Likewise,
not all attorneys are even capable of handling a case in which they represent

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 13.
Id.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 17.
Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
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multiple codefendants.62 An attorney may be encouraged to take such a
case, even though they are unsure of their ability to handle it, because of the
prospect of greater monetary compensation.63
Finally, considering the majority’s suggestion that requiring judicial
inquiry into joint representation by trial courts should only be required by
rule or statute, the dissent suggests some factors to consider in formulating
such a rule or statute.64 To begin, the dissent suggests that any future rule or
statute be modeled after Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44.65
Essentially this rule requires that the court inform defendants of the
potential problems that arise with joint representation anytime they wish to
enter into such a situation.66 The dissent also posits a few other
considerations for such a rule or statute, such as suggesting that the “. . .
advisement by the trial court should be placed on the record,” ensuring that
the trial court’s obligation to guard against conflicts continues throughout a
trial, and that defendants should be required to waive their right to separate
representation in a manner understandable to the common individual.67
As seen above, the dissent would ideally find that the trial court always
has an obligation to inquire about joint representation whenever it arises in a
criminal case.68 Accepting that the majority of the Court has decided
otherwise, the dissent lays out some guidelines for establishing a future rule
or drafting a future statute that will require such an inquiry by trial courts in
the future.69
IV.

ANALYSIS
A. Introduction

The Court’s decision here, at least for the time being, settles an issue of
great importance. From now on, unless the legislature adopts a statute
placing a different burden on trial courts, they will continue to apply the test
announced by the Supreme Court of Ohio in this case.70 This ruling will
continue to significantly affect the rights of criminal defendants in Ohio
until the Legislature acts. This analysis will give a summary of the effects of
this ruling, while also suggesting how best to move forward.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, 22-23.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 5.
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B. Discussion
i. Effects of This Ruling on Future Criminal Trials
The ruling by the Court in this case will perpetuate a significant
disadvantage faced by criminal defendants seeking to utilize joint
representation, while also perpetuating what may one day be decisively
labeled as a violation of a criminal defendant’s rights under both the United
States and Ohio constitutions. Before proposing a remedy for this issue, it
seems necessary to highlight some of the more concrete harms that
defendants will continue to suffer under the Court’s ruling.
To begin, one of the major problems with joint representation of
criminal defendants is that it is often hard to gauge whether the defendant
understands the situation enough to intelligently and independently waive
their right to independent representation.71 This is largely due to an
attorney’s self interest in obtaining such a waiver, given the significant
financial compensation involved in joint representation cases.72
Additionally, societal pressures, such as those posed by a codefendant that
is a spouse, friend, or coworker can cause defendants to waive their right to
independent counsel without fully understanding the consequences of such a
decision.73 For instance, in this case the codefendants were husband and
wife.74 As such, without proper judicial inquiry into joint representation
situations, it is likely that a defendant is waiving a constitutional right
without being fully informed of the consequences.
Additionally, without any requirement that courts inquire about the
potential conflicts associated with joint representation, it is possible that a
joint representation situation which was conflict free at the outset develops a
serious conflict during the litigation which will go unaddressed.75 For
instance, the discovery on new evidence implicating one codefendant and
not the other, as well as plea negotiations requiring testimony by one
codefendant against another may raise conflicts during the later stages of a
case that simply were not present at the outset.76 Continuing the practice of
allowing joint representation of criminal defendants without any judicial
supervision will only exacerbate these issues.
Lastly, both attorneys and clients are more inclined to enter joint
representation arrangements because of the financial incentives for each

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Bassett, supra note 2, at 392.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 441-42.
Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 2.
Bassett, supra note 2, at 443.
Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 18.
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party.77 While joint representation offers a chance for an attorney to receive
more compensation for their work, it also allows codefendants to save some
money, as these services are often discounted slightly for codefendants.78 In
this way, attorneys feel pressure to enter joint representation arrangements
even when there is the potential for conflicts to arise, due to financial
compensation involved.79 On the other hand, codefendants are pressured
into such arrangements due to the financial savings that may be realized.80
Without judicial oversight, these financial incentives for both parties
encourage uninformed and irrational waiver of a constitutional right.
ii. Solutions to the Issue at Hand
In looking at how to move forward considering the Court’s decision and
the various pitfalls associated with joint representation, several solutions
seem not only appropriate but necessary. From the legislature passing a
statute to address this issue to collaborating with the courts to adopt a new
court rule addressing joint representation, the solution is now largely out of
the hands of the Court following their decision here.81
The easiest and most economical solution to the issue of joint
representation of criminal defendants is for the Ohio legislature to pass a
statute outlining the requirements of trial courts faced with joint
representation situations. As Justice Brunner stated in his dissent, a statute
based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44 would best address this
issue.82 Such a statute would ensure that a trial court always has the
obligation to inquire about joint representation situations whenever it is
faced with one.83 Additionally, it would require that criminal defendants
wishing to be jointly represented be “personally advise[d]” by the court of
their right to separate representation.84 Such a solution would have the
added benefit of being in line with Federal court requirements on the
subject, ensuring compliance with the United States Constitution’s
requirements regarding joint representation.85
In addition, the Supreme Court of Ohio and the Ohio Legislature could
collaborate to adopt a rule of practice governing the trial courts of Ohio in
relation to joint representation of criminal defendants.86 In Ohio, the
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Bassett, supra note 2, at 442.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 13-14.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c)(2)).
Id. at 21.
Williams, 2021-Ohio-3152, at 21.
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practice for adopting “rules of practice and procedure” for courts is handled
by the Supreme Court of Ohio.87 The Supreme Court of Ohio has the
authority to “prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts
of the state” subject only to veto by the Ohio Legislature via a concurrent
resolution of disapproval from approved by both house of the legislature.88
Such a rule promulgated by the Court, so long as it is not vetoed by the
legislature, would have the same effect as a statute pronouncing a new
obligation for the courts of Ohio.89 This would be the best option, as it
allows for a collaborative effort to take place between the Court and the
legislature, though it is unlikely to happen given the Court’s unwillingness
to adopt such a rule in this case.
Looking to other jurisdictions, it is clear that the majority of
jurisdictions have adopted rulings similar to that of Ohio.90 For instance,
Washington only requires a trial judge to inquire about multiple
representation when “there are special circumstances such that the court
knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.”91
Georgia has also adopted a similar ruling.92 However, Delaware has adopted
a rule more akin to that suggested by Justice Brunner in his dissent,
imposing “the duty to promptly inquire with respect to . . . joint
representation [by codefendants] and [to] personally advise each defendant
of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate
representation.93 As such, while there is not much support among the states
for requiring a trial judge to inquire about joint representation every time
they are presented with the situation, some state like Delaware have taken
this step.94
V.

CONCLUSION

The ruling by the Court in this case represents a significant perpetuation
of a practice that can adequately be described as violating the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants. While it is understandable that the Court is
wary of pronouncing a rule that the legislature has no input in crafting, it is
imperative that the process of formulating such a rule take place to
safeguard these constitutional rights. As Justice Brunner pointed out in his
87. Commission on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, https://www
.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/practiceprocedure/constitution.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. State v. Frank, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 520 at 12 (1999); Burns v. State, 281 Ga. 338, 341
(2006); State v. Avina-Murillo, 301 Neb. 185, 203 (2018).
91. Frank, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS, at 12.
92. Burns, 281 Ga. At 341.
93. Lewis v. State, 757 A.2d 709, 716 (2000).
94. Id.
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dissent, a criminal defendant’s right to separate representation is protected
by Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.95 Failing to protect this
right by declining to require trial courts to, at the very least, ensure that
criminal defendants waive it in a “knowing and intelligent” manner means
that some criminal defendants undoubtedly will be prejudiced by the
practice.96 Given that attorneys are often forbidden to even point out the
conflicts that may arise as a result of joint representation because of their
ethical obligations, it is unlikely that the process adopted by the Court in
this case will adequately safeguard this right.97 As such, the Ohio
Legislature or the Supreme Court of Ohio should remedy this violation of
criminal defendants’ constitutional rights by passing a statute or adopting a
rule of practice requiring that trial courts inquire about the propriety of joint
representation anytime they are faced with such a situation.
BRANDON GRIGSBY

95. Williams, 2021-Ohio-3125, at 13-14.
96. Id. at 17.
97. Id. at 18.
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